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INTRABANK CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
PETER C. BUCKt
KRISTA R. BOWEN$
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators have, since the 1970s, discussed
potential conflicts of interest that may arise within a banking institution.
In today's business climate, this discussion gains additional
relevance and importance. The combination of the rapid growth
and consolidation of banks, the continued expansion of the scope of
services provided by banks, and the high level of merger and acquisition
activity, generally, and among financial services providers in
particular, increases the possibility of conflicts and heightens
uncertainty about what banks can do to avoid conflict situations.
As they become more prevalent, potential bank conflicts are being
subjected to greater scrutiny.' This paper does not purport to provide
t Peter C. Buck is a partner in the law firm of Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.,
Charlotte, North Carolina. Mr. Buck received his Bachelor of Arts degree in business
administration from Duke University in 1969. He received his law degree in 1976 from
Duke University, where he was a member of the Order of the Coif and Editor in Chief of the
Duke Law Journal. Mr. Buck served for two years as chairman of the Corporations
Committee of the Business Law Section of the Bar Association and has represented buyers,
sellers, and lenders in numerous acquisition transactions.
t Krista R. Bowen is an associate in the law firm of Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.,
Charlotte, North Carolina. Ms. Bowen received her B.S. B.Ad. Degree in finance from
West Virginia University in 1994. She received her law degree in 1997 from Washington &
Lee University, where she was a member of Order of the Coif and Lead Articles Editor of
the Washington & Lee Law Review. Ms. Bowen is a former law clerk to the Honorable H.
Emory Widener, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
1. See, e.g., Christina Binkley, Chase's Role in Patriot Bids is Questioned, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 12, 1999, at Cl. According to the recent Wall Street Journal article, Chase
Manhattan Corp is playing questionable three-way role in negotiations over financial
restructuring of Patriot American Hospitality Inc; Chase is leading lender to Patriot and is
advising Patriot as it weighs competing bids by Hilton Hotels and Apollo Real Estate
Advisors, but Chase is also leading syndicate that would refinance Patriot if Apollo wins
bidding. See id.
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a comprehensive statement of all potential conflicts or to set out all
protective measures that may be required by banking institutions.
Rather, it seeks to highlight some potential conflict situations, suggest
some steps banks may take to protect themselves from liability, and,
primarily, to encourage banks and their legal counsel to increase their
awareness of and focus on these issues.
This article describes several conflicts of interest that
commercial banks may encounter. Section II examines conflicts
involving the dissemination of confidential information. Part IIA
addresses the potential conflict that arises when a bank disseminates
nonpublic information within its commercial loan department and,
more problematically, the conflict that ensues when such information
is disclosed to certain third parties, such as an acquiring company.
Part IIB discusses conflicts arising from the dissemination of
confidential information to a separate bank department, such as the
trust department, whose function it is to recommend particular
investments to its clients. Part IIC outlines appropriate defensive
strategies for preventing and resolving information based conflicts
problems. Finally, Section III examines the potential conflict
situations that arise out of a financial institution's dual role as lender
and fiduciary under an indenture agreement. This section summarizes
the legislative efforts in this area and assesses the effectiveness of the
post-default conflict standard.
II. INFORMATIONAL CONFLICTS
Informational conflicts are often referred to as "conflicts of
interest" between banks and their customers. They are more
appropriately characterized, however, as conflicts between bank
customers. The tension arises from the different interests of two or
more customers of the banking institution's services. The bank's
responsibility is to take these different interests into account when it
determines how best to protect customer confidentiality and deliver
financial services.
Perhaps the most visible conflict of interest presents itself
when a borrower asks the bank to finance its acquisition of another
bank customer. Similar concerns arise in the following situations:
(1) the bank acts as lender for more than one bidder in an auction of a
[Vol. 3
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corporation; (2) the bank acts as agent for a syndicated loan and
underwrites a Rule 144A high-yield debt offering; and (3) the bank
acts as senior lender and indenture trustee on a public bond issue. The
same legal concerns confront the bank in each of these situations, and
thus a similar analysis should apply. Though not discussed in this
paper, banking institutions should also be aware of the potential
conflicts that may arise under the Glass-Steagall Act.
A. Intradepartment Conflicts
As previously noted, a potential conflict situation arises when a
bank has provided services for a target in the past and now proposes to
provide financing for an acquirer of that target company. The bank
may, as a result of its prior or continuing relationship with the target,
have material, nonpublic information about the target. Although the
courts have refused to place an absolute prohibition on the bank's
ability to serve both corporate customers, they have placed limitations
on the bank's ability to disseminate and use the nonpublic information
it has about the target company.
In the first case to address the conflicts issue in the takeover
context, American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,2 a bank customer, American Medicorp,
Inc. (American), sought to enjoin the bank from making a loan to
Humana, Inc. (Humana), another bank customer that planned a
takeover of American. Because of its prior commercial lending
relationship with American, the bank had acquired a file of nonpublic
financial and other information about American.3  American first
argued that providing financing to Humana would constitute a per se
breach of a fiduciary obligation of the bank.4 In addition, American
argued that the bank had used some of plaintiff's confidential
information in deciding whether to make the loan to Humana.5
The federal district court refused to impose a complete
prohibition on a bank's ability to lend money to a company seeking to
2. American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
3. See id. at 7.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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take over a bank customer that has previously provided nonpublic
information to the bank.6 Instead, the court focused on whether the
bank had "used or relied upon" any of the confidential information
that American had provided.7 American produced evidence that one
of the officers working on Humana's loan had seen and "flipped
through" plaintiff's credit fie, including a 13-page summary, and that
another officer involved in Humana's loan had read the information in
American's file several years earlier. 8 Finally, plaintiff contended that
an informal meeting had occurred between two loan officers working
on the Humana loan and two officers working on American's account
in which the officers discussed the proposed acquisition and the
amount of plaintiff's business the bank might lose as a result of the
planned takeover.9 The bank denied use of American's nonpublic
information in making a decision about the Humana loan, and a bank
officer testified that the decision to provide financing to Humana was
based on Humana's financial capabilities and not on the financial
condition of American."0
Emphasizing that there had been no disclosure to third parties,
the court found that "[t]he fact that some of defendant's officers who
were responsible for [Humana's] loan obtained, saw, touched, and to
some extent used and interchanged information from the defendant's
files on plaintiff ... is not a per se violation of a trust." 1 The court
also found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not sufficient to
prove that the bank used or relied on plaintiff's confidential
information in deciding whether to make the loan to Humana. 2 If a
bank "does not rely on the confidential information of its customers in
its files," the court ruled "[it] is free to deal with any customer who
comes to it." 3 Concluding that the plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on
the merits of its claim, the court refused to enjoin the bank's loan to
the potential acquirer.' 4
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 8.
9. See id. at 8-9.
10. See id. at 9.
ii. Id.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 8.
14. See id. at 10.
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Subsequently, in Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 5 the
Third Circuit considered the same question of what limits, if any, the
law imposes on a commercial bank that wants to make a loan to one
client to facilitate that client's takeover of another bank client.1
6
Several years prior to the takeover attempt, Chemical Bank (Chemical)
had served as a participating lender (contributing 22.5% of the funds)
in a $10 million line of credit for Washington Steel Corporation
(Washington). 17  Chemical also served as one of two registrars for
Washington's common stock.' 8 In the course of participating in the
loan, Chemical received certain nonpublic information about
Washington, including financial statements and a study of cash flows
and future earnings projections.1 9
Chemical had also previously served as lead lender on loans to
Talley Industries, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, TW
Corporation (collectively, Talley). Talley decided to acquire
Washington and sought financing from Chemical. The Chemical
Corporate Banking Department discussed the potential conflict, but
ultimately decided that the bank was not precluded from participating
in the proposed loan to Talley. After performing a credit analysis of
Talley, senior bank officers approved the loan.20
Washington subsequently filed suit, attempting to enjoin the
loan and alleging that Chemical had violated its fiduciary duty by
misusing confidential information obtained from Washington in
deciding whether to finance Talley's tender offer. 2' Like the American
Medicorp court, the Third Circuit concluded that the case law did not
support imposition of a per se fiduciary duty on the bank based on its
receipt of confidential information.22 The Third Circuit added that a
per se prohibition would be contrary to public policy by impeding the
availability of funding for capital ventures. 23 The court explained that
15. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
16. See id. at 595.
17. See id. at 596.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 597.
22. See id. at 599-601 (characterizing the per se rule suggested by Washington as
"wholly unprecedented" and criticizing Washington's attempt to "draw a fiduciary rabbit
from a commercial loan agreement hat").
23. See id. at 601.
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"[c]ompanies seeking to insulate themselves from takeovers, or even
from ordinary competition, could simply arrange for a series of loans
from most of the major banks, supplying those banks with the requisite
non-public information," and thus those banks would be "foreclosed
from financing competitors and potential acquirers of the borrowing
firms. "
24
The Washington Steel court next examined Washington's claim
that Chemical had misused the nonpublic information it had obtained
from Washington. As in American Medicorp, the court first
emphasized that there was no allegation that Chemical had relayed any
nonpublic information to Talley.2 s Washington made two claims
regarding misuse of information. First, Washington argued for a
"presumption of use" based on an alleged need to examine
Washington's financial situation in view of Talley's alleged financial
weaknesses. Second, Washington argued actual use based on the
silence of the Chemical officer in charge of the Washington account at
a meeting regarding the proposed Talley loan. Washington based this
argument on the theory that the officer's silence suggested to Talley
that the target, Washington, was a good investment. 2 6 Rejecting both
of these arguments, the court queried what the loan officer could have
been expected to do other than to remain silent and pointed out that the
bank had taken steps to keep the Washington files away from those
personnel working on the Talley loan.27
Going beyond the American Medicorp decision, the court went
on to state that, even assuming the bank had used the confidential
information, "[w]e do not believe that a bank violates any duty it may
owe to one of its borrowers when it uses information received from
that borrower in deciding whether or not to make a loan to another
prospective borrower. ' ' 21 The court explained that it is within the
province of the legislature rather than the courts to establish rules
limiting the dissemination of confidential information within a bank's
loan department. 29 The court also expressed opposition to any such
24. Id.
25. See id. at 602.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 602-03.
28. Id. at 603.
29. See id.
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rule on policy grounds, stating that a limitation on information
available to banks for the purpose of making lending decisions would
impede the free flow of funds by either: (1) causing banks to enter
transactions without full information, thus resulting in potential
violations of their duty to depositors; or (2) discouraging banks from
lending money to corporations that expressed an interest in acquiring
other bank customers.30 The court limited the scope of its opinion,
however, to the commercial loan department of the bank and did not
express an opinion on whether, and to what extent, a bank can
disseminate nonpublic information to other bank departments, such as
the trust department, or to third parties.31 The court did caution that
such disclosures might constitute violations of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the corresponding SEC rule,
Rule 10b-5.32 The portion of the court's decision suggesting that use
of nonpublic information within the bank is permissible on public
policy grounds has been criticized. For example, one commentator
asserts that prohibiting the bank from using nonpublic information
internally does not disadvantage the bank, but merely puts it on equal
ground with other banks that do not have access to such confidential
information.33
After almost twenty years of judicial silence on this subject, a
New York state trial court recently addressed this issue again, stating
the question presented as "whether a commercial bank breaches a
fiduciary duty by agreeing to finance the hostile takeover of one
corporate customer by another." 34 As in the two previous cases, the
court held that "a bank has no per se obligation to refrain from such
30. See id.
31. See id. at 603-04.
32. See id.
33. See Thomas M. MilIhiser, Conflicts of Interest: The Chinese Wall and Bank
Financing of Hostile Tender Offers, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 953, 958 (1980); see also
Mary S. Butch, Case Comment, Bank Use of Confidential Information to Evaluate
Applications for Financing of Tender Offers: Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 61
B.U. L. REv. 245, 260 (1981) (stating that restricting the use of nonpublic information
means that "[tihe bank is in the same position as any other bank evaluating a proposed
loan" and that "allowing the bank to use the confidential information would give it an
unfair advantage over other banks which might finance the tender offer by reducing the
known risk the bank undertakes when it advances funds to... borrower[s]").
34. ADT Operations, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 662 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191
(Sup. Ct. 1997).
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participation." 35 Making the same factual distinction as the American
Medicorp and Washington Steel courts, the ADT court emphasized that
the plaintiff might have an actionable claim if the bank had
disseminated nonpublic information directly to the acquiring
company.36 The ADT court, however, took a more restrictive view on
the bank's use of confidential information than the Washington Steel
court by adding that the complaint would state a claim if nonpublic
information were "used by the bank in advising the acquirer." 
3 7
In 1993, ADT Operations, Inc. (ADT), entered into a $500
million credit facility with a syndicate of banks that was co-managed
by Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase).38 In its complaint, ADT alleged
that during the course of arranging the financing, "Chase assumed the
role of a financial advisor and encouraged ADT Operations to confide
in the bank with respect to every facet of its business and
operations." 39 In the course of its dealings with Chase, ADT provided
Chase with numerous nonpublic financial documents. According to
ADT, it provided such information based on the "express
understanding that it would remain confidential and that Chase would
use it only for the purposes relating to the credit loan facilities and for
providing financial advice to ADT." 4 0 In addition, ADT asserted that
Chase had signed a confidentiality agreement to that same effect. 41
Finally, ADT claimed that Chase personnel had represented that it was
bank policy "not to finance or otherwise assist in the hostile takeover
of a bank customer without the customer's consent." 42 In 1996, ADT
discovered that Chase planned to finance the hostile takeover of ADT
by Western Resources, Inc. (Western). 43 According to ADT, in the
course of the takeover financing, Chase supplied Western with certain
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. Id. Compare id., with Washington Steel, 602 F.2d at 603 (stating that "[w]e do
not believe that a bank violates any duty it may owe to one of its borrowers when it uses
information received from that borrower in deciding whether or not to make a loan to
another prospective borrower.")
38. See ADT Operations, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 192.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See id.
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nonpublic information it had acquired from ADT. 4
In its analysis, the court first recognized that, in general, the
legal relationship between a bank and its customer is "an arm's-
length, debtor-creditor relationship that does not, without more, create
a fiduciary relationship." 45 As in American Medicorp and Washington
Steel, the court rejected a per se rule forbidding the dual
representation and stated that "a fiduciary duty is not created by the
mere communication of confidential information from the customer to
the bank .... 46 The court added that a customer's "unilateral
placement" of trust in a bank does not, by itself, create a fiduciary
obligation.47 Following that affirmation of precedent, however, the
ADT court held that "[a] fiduciary relationship may arise between a
bank and its customer where the bank assumes control and
responsibility over the customer's assets and operations, or where the
customer places special trust and confidence in the bank and thereby
becomes dependent on it." 4
8
Because ADT had, in the court's view, failed to produce any
evidence, other than conclusory statements, of Chase's assumption of
any duty to provide it with advice or counsel, the court dismissed the
claims based on breach of fiduciary duty.49 The court explained that
there was no evidence that the bank had agreed to become ADT's
advisor or agent with respect to the financing of hostile takeovers. In
dicta, the court stated that the "bank's mere receipt and internal use of
confidential information in making its financing decisions does not
create a fiduciary duty . ... " 'o
The court recognized, however, that ADT might have a
cognizable claim based on breach of the written confidentiality
agreement that forbade Chase from using certain nonpublic
information "other than in connection with [Chase's] engagement
under the Engagement Agreement. " s' Any such claim would not
extend to information received outside the Engagement Agreement and
44. Seeid.
45. Id. at 192-93 (citing a line of New York cases).
46. Id. at 195.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 193.
49. See id. at 195-96.
50. Id. at 196
51. Id.
1999]
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would not cover publicly available information. 52
As in the two previous cases, the court cautioned against
dissemination of nonpublic information to third parties; however, the
court interpreted this prohibition more broadly than prior courts by
implying that this obligation could be violated by a breach of the
bank's Chinese Wall. 3 Although acknowledging that not every breach
of a Chinese Wall is material, the court stated that "any breach which
directly assists [the acquirer] or gives it an unfair advantage in its
takeover efforts [is] actionable." 54  Although the ADT case has not
been followed by any other court and has spawned only very limited
commentary, one practical effect is that corporations may avoid
obtaining financing from a certain bank, even one of their primary
relationship banks, if they know that the bank has a relationship with
their potential acquisition targets. 55
The ADT court's emphasis on the bank's role and assumption
of specific fiduciary obligations is consistent with a prior federal
district court decision. Unlike in the traditional debtor-creditor
context, courts may be more willing to find the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between "financial advisors" and their clients.
For example, in General Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp Inc.,
56
GenCorp Inc. (GenCorp) claimed that Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.
and its subsidiary, Shearson Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.
(collectively, Shearson), had breached its fiduciary duty to GenCorp.
Shearson had acted as the investment and financial advisor for
GenCorp in connection with two GenCorp financial matters,
performing a financial analysis of a potential leveraged buyout of one
of GenCorp's subsidiaries and advising GenCorp in connection with its
decision whether to pursue an acquisition of Goodyear Aerospace.57
In connection with these two transactions, GenCorp provided
52. See id.
53. See id. (stating that the bank's internal policies should forbid disclosure to third
parties and should "create a 'Chinese Wall' between its corporate loan department and its
mergers and acquisitions division.").
54. Id.
55. See It's Who You Don't Know; Union Pacific Avoids Relationship Banks in Hostile
Bid for Pennzoil, BANK LETTER, June 30, 1997, at 1 (discussing Union Pacific Resources'
decision to use Credit Suisse First Boston rather than one of its top three relationship
banks because of those banks' close ties to its potential target).
56. General Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp Inc., 766 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
57. See id. at 1466.
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nonpublic information to Shearson, including internal projections and
forecasts, GenCorp's cost of capital, and its ability and willingness to
obtain financing and utilize its existing resources. 58 Following
GenCorp's decision not to pursue the acquisition of Goodyear
Aerospace, Shearson sent a letter to GenCorp stating that "[w]e would
like to... develop a relationship with you whereby we can offer
meaningful ideas and suggestions for implementation of your
strategy. "19
While it was working with GenCorp, Shearson was also
serving as an advisor to Wagner & Brown with regard to potential
acquisition candidates. 60  During these engagements, Shearson also
purchased more than 600,000 shares of GenCorp stock.6 1 When
Shearson presented a list of acquisition candidates to Wagner &
Brown, it named GenCorp as the most attractive candidate. 62
Shearson then submitted a written report to Wagner & Brown that
included a discussion of some of the nonpublic information that
Shearson had obtained as a result of its relationship with GenCorp. 6
In addition to recommending GenCorp as the most desirable target,
Shearson also provided, through its affiliate, $1.25 billion in financing
for the acquisition. 4  Although Wagner & Brown eventually
abandoned its attempted tender offer, GenCorp brought suit against
Shearson for breach of fiduciary duty.65 GenCorp based its fiduciary
duty claim on three different grounds: (1) an agency relationship; (2) a
defacto fiduciary relationship; and (3) a "prospective agency." 66
Although finding that Shearson acted as an independent
contractor in its role as financial advisor, the court held that a
principal-agent relationship, and thus a fiduciary relationship, existed
between Shearson and GenCorp. 67 According to the court, an agency
58. See id.
59. Id. at 1467.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. For example, the report discussed GenCorp's consideration and rejection
of a plan to acquire Goodyear Aerospace and some of the reasons for its decision. See id.
64. See id. at 1468.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1470-71.
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relationship existed based on GenCorp's "control" over Shearson,
more specifically: (1) GenCorp's acceptance of Shearson's offer to
provide financial advice with regard to the proposed acquisition;
(2) GenCorp's retention of the right to terminate the relationship with
Shearson; and (3) GenCorp's ability to control the degree of
Shearson's participation in the contemplated transactions.68 Finally,
the court pointed out that Shearson's actions were "directed toward
the attainment of GenCorp's interests." 69 Although this was not the
type of analysis applied by the ADT court, banking institutions should
be aware that a court could apply an agency analysis to banks'
relationships with their customers in determining whether a fiduciary
duty exists. Thus, as banks move away from the traditional debtor-
creditor relationship and become more involved in advising and
counseling clients, there is a growing danger that a court could
characterize them as fiduciaries of the client, and thus hold them liable
for any breach of that duty.
The court next examined the question of whether a de facto
fiduciary relationship existed between Shearson and GenCorp.
Although acknowledging that a fiduciary relationship does not arise
from an arm's-length transaction, the court stated that a de facto
fiduciary relationship is created "where both parties understand that a
special trust or confidence has been reposed." 70 The court explained
that a "financial advisor [does not] always assume a fiduciary duty by
providing advice to an entity or individual," 7 but imposed a de facto
fiduciary duty based on the specific facts of the Shearson
relationship.72 Because of the "nature of the relationship" between
GenCorp and Shearson and the confidential information that GenCorp
provided to Shearson, the court held, both parties "must have
understood that a special trust or confidence had been reposed in
Shearson not to disclose this confidential information to third
parties." 73 Because of its imposition of a fiduciary duty on other
68. See id. at 1471.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094 (Ohio 1981)).
71. Id. at 1473.
72. See id.
73. Id.
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grounds, the court did not discuss "prospective agency," 74 the third
ground alleged by GenCorp.
The court next discussed whether Shearson had breached its
fiduciary duty to GenCorp. GenCorp alleged a breach of fiduciary
duty on three different bases: (1) Shearson's disclosure of confidential
information to Wagner & Brown; (2) Shearson's failure to disclose to
GenCorp its simultaneous relationship with Wagner & Brown; and (3)
Shearson's purchase of GenCorp stock for its own account. 75 Citing
the rule that "a fiduciary is under a duty not to disclose or use for his
own benefit confidential information acquired in the course of its
fiduciary relationship," 76 the court refused to dismiss GenCorp's first
breach claim.77 On the second ground, the court found that Shearson's
dual role presented an "inherent conflict of interest" and concluded
that, given Shearson's knowledge of Wagner & Brown's interest in
acquiring a company similar to GenCorp, it was "essential" for
Shearson to inform GenCorp of its relationship with Wagner &
Brown.78 With regard to GenCorp's third claim based on insider
trading, the court stated "[h]aving found that Shearson owed GenCorp
fiduciary duties, the Court further holds that a breach of this duty may
have occurred if Shearson did purchase GenCorp stock on the basis of
confidential information acquired in the course of their fiduciary
relationship." 
79
One could argue that this case does not add to or change the
law expressed in the three bank cases discussed above. The GenCorp
case is factually distinguishable from the other cases because it
involves a clear disclosure of material, nonpublic information to a
third party. It is difficult to determine how much this disclosure
74. Under the theory of "prospective agency", a prospective agent is vested with
fiduciary responsibilities and duties towards a prospective principal or employer. See id.
In other words, "[a] person who. . . invites a confidence or permits the prospective
principal to reveal confidential information to him, is subject to the same duties with
respect to such information as if, at the time the confidence was given, he were in fact an
agent." Id.
75. See id. at 1474-75.
76. Id. at 1475.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1476. It is unclear how Shearson could have made a meaningful
disclosure of such information to GenCorp without alerting GenCorp to Wagner &
Brown's consideration of the company as a potential takeover target, and thus potentially
breaching a duty to Wagner & Brown.
79. Id. at 1477.
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contributed to the court's analysis, and the same court may have been
unwilling to impose a fiduciary duty or to find a breach of such duty if
the facts of the case had been different.
Even though the GenCorp case involved a disclosure to a third
party, the case may be interpreted to mean that some courts will
impose a fiduciary duty on a bank if it steps out of the traditional
debtor-creditor role and into the role of "advisor." For example, if a
bank acts as advisor to a company that is bidding on another
corporation, it is possible that a court would impose a fiduciary duty
on that relationship and find a violation of that duty if the bank also
engaged in advising another bidder for the same corporation. In
addition, if a bank accepted the role of advisor to a potential acquirer
in a takeover bid and then loaned money to the target in a defensive
recapitalization transaction, the bank might have breached a duty to
the acquirer. A bank that encounters this type of situation should
closely examine the terms of its engagement letter with the first client.
If the bank has agreed to act as advisor to a potential acquirer, the
bank may not want to finance the target's defensive recapitalization.
At a minimum, the bank should advise the acquirer up front that the
bank might be contractually obligated from an earlier agreement to
lend money to the target.80 As banks move away from their traditional
roles and continue to expand the range of services they offer, they
move into more dangerous territory.
There are few certainties in the existing case law; however, it
appears that courts will not impose per se fiduciary duties on
traditional debtor-creditor relationships. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, it is clear that banks should not disclose any nonpublic
information to third parties, especially if a confidentiality agreement
would prohibit such disclosure. Between these two poles, the courts
have provided little guidance to banks. Because of the limited case
law available, the most important step for banks is to increase their
awareness of the potential conflicts involved in playing dual roles or in
serving customers with competing interests.
Assuming that a bank has a duty to refrain from using
80. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Dan C. Aardal, Securities
Related Activities of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, in INSTITUTE OF BANKING LAW
AND REGULATION 1989, at 757, 786-96 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. A4-4273, 1989).
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nonpublic information in deciding whether to finance the takeover of a
bank customer, the question remains how a bank can satisfy that duty,
and just as important, how the duty will be enforced. If a bank
customer brings suit based on misuse of confidential information, it is
not clear who has the burden of proving either misuse or nonuse.
Placing the burden of proving misuse on the plaintiff practically
requires the plaintiff to have a bank employee testify that the bank
used the confidential information or to produce a writing of the bank
indicating use of the nonpublic material. The burden becomes more
onerous if, as suggested by the American Medicorp court, the plaintiff
must also show reliance by the bank.81 Placing the burden of proving
non-use on the bank, however, would require the bank to perform the
nearly impossible task of proving a negative proposition. Unless the
bank can prove non-use by producing evidence of the existence and
use of a Chinese Wall, as described in more detail below, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the bank to meet its burden of proof. 82
B. Interdepartment Conflicts
Commercial banks also face the problem of conflicts of interest
resulting from the capabilities of their various departments to serve in
multiple roles. Like the intradepartment conflicts described above,
these conflicts can also be characterized as "informational
conflicts" - conflicts created by the potential for information to flow
between various areas of the bank. As discussed above, these types of
informational conflicts do not prevent the bank from participating in
multiple roles. Rather, the bank must take precautionary measures to
stop the improper flow of information.
For example, a commercial bank faces conflict of interest and
potential insider trading problems if nonpublic information flows
between its commercial lending department and its trust department.
More specifically, the lending department may have obtained
confidential information about a public corporation as a result of a
lending negotiation or transaction. Simultaneously, the trust
department may be recommending or consummating transactions in
81. See American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
of Chicago, 475 F. Supp. 5, 8-9 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
82. See Millhiser, supra note 33, at 959 n.47.
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the same corporation's securities for customer accounts. Because the
bank as trustee has a duty to maximize the return on its trusts, there is
an incentive to use any information it obtains as an aid in investing
trust assets. Therefore, the bank must have a procedure to prevent
confidential information obtained by the loan department from being
disseminated to those persons making investments for the trust
department.13 Another situation in which the same problem arises,
and thus the same analysis applies, is when a bank serves as fiduciary
to an employee benefit plan and has nonpublic information about the
issuer of a security that is held by that plan. 14
Other ways in which a commercial bank may obtain
confidential information that must not be disclosed to its trust
department include: (1) from the bank's municipal bond department
that underwrites municipal securities which are traded in public
secondary markets; (2) as a result of its role as advisor to a public
corporation engaged in a private placement of its securities; and
(3) through its participation in the financing of tender offers for public
corporations.8 s  In all of these situations, the bank must prevent
disclosure of nonpublic information to the trust department through
construction of Chinese Walls.
Although a Chinese Wall appears to be the logical solution to
this interdepartment informational conflict, a problem arises if the
Wall impedes the intrabank exchange of relevant public information, 16
thus exposing the bank to liability for any resulting harm to the trust
beneficiaries.8 7 For example, a bank loan department may have
substantial information, some confidential and some public, about a
client. In the trust department, even if a trustee fails to conduct a
reasonable investigation, the trustee is deemed to have constructive
knowledge of all "readily ascertainable, relevant facts." Thus, the
public knowledge the loan department has needs to be transferred to
83. See Marc I. Steinberg & John Fletcher, Compliance Programs for Insider
Trading, 47 SMU L. REv. 1783, 1803 (1994).
84. For an in-depth discussion of this topic, see Allan Horwich, Bank Fiduciaries with
Material Inside Information: Responsibilities and Risks, 113 BANKING L.J. 4 (1996).
85. See id.
86. See David L. Abney & Mark A. Nadeau, National Banks, the Impassable
"Chinese Wall, " and Breach of Trust: Shaping a Solution, 107 BANKING L.J. 251, 258
(1990).
87. See id. at 251.
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the trust department.88 Because the only other options are divestiture
of the trust department or a bank policy prohibiting trust investments
that relate to any corporate clients of the bank, the Chinese Wall,
though imperfect, is the most realistic solution.
Some have suggested replacement of the traditional Chinese
Wall that blocks the flow of all information to the trust department
with a "permeable" wall that allows the flow of selected information.
Developing an accurate and effective filtering device would be
extremely difficult, however. Implementation of an effective
permeable wall would require an independent party or committee to
evaluate all information and determine whether it should be allowed to
flow through the wall.8 9 Complete independence of the party or
committee would be required because of the ability to "straddle the
wall." If a permeable wall is adopted, only publicly accessible
information should be permitted to pass through the wall, and all
information passed to the trust department should be documented in
order to refute potential claims of insider trading. 90 Because this
option involves discretionary decisionmaking, it is more susceptible to
challenge by third parties than the more traditional Chinese Wall. In
spite of its drawback, the permeable wall may be the most viable
alternative now available for some banks.
C. Chinese Walls as Defensive Measures
For both intrabank and interbank conflict situations, a bank's
only real defense against charges that it has wrongfully disseminated
or misused confidential information is the construction of a Chinese
Wall. At a minimum, construction of a Chinese Wall may shift the
burden of proof to a party challenging the bank's actions. For
example, existence of a Chinese Wall could serve as prima facie
evidence that the bank has not misused or wrongfully disseminated
confidential information. Although in a slightly different factual
context, at least one court has held that breach of a Chinese Wall must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, thus placing the burden
88. See id. at 253.
89. See id. at 259-60.
90. See id.
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of proof on the plaintiff.9'
The primary purpose of a Chinese Wall is to prevent the flow
of nonpublic information to conflicting parties. In the acquisition
context, the Wall should prevent both the potential acquirer and the
bank personnel (including credit approval committees) involved in its
takeover financing from obtaining confidential information about the
target corporation. This purpose can be achieved in a variety of ways.
One article aptly describes a Chinese Wall as "a statement by a
bank that it is the bank's policy to safeguard confidential customer
information and that it has established and has followed procedures
and safeguards to carry out this policy." 92 For example, the statement
may be set out as part of the bank's Code of Conduct, in a Statement
of Policy and Procedures or in some other compliance manual that is
provided to all bank personnel. Another important preliminary step is
to create programs to educate all bank personnel on such policies and
procedures.
Depending on the factual situation, various additional measures
will be required. For example, one article suggests that banks adopt
appropriate combinations of the following: (1) physical separation of
departments in different buildings or different parts of the same
building; (2) maintenance of separate records, accounting systems and
staff; (3) adoption of methods for identifying confidential documents;
(4) use of secure filing systems; (5) restricting access in departments
where confidentiality concerns exist; (6) restricting transfer of
personnel between departments; and (7) using code names for sensitive
projects.93 Effectively restricting access to certain areas of the bank
might require restricting physical access to the department, limiting
physical access to files and restricting computer access to various files
and information.
For example, in Washington Steel, Chemical erected a Chinese
Wall around Washington Steel's files and the personnel working on
the Washington Steel account. Chemical prohibited the personnel
91. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (E.D. Wis.
1979), aft'd, 624 F.2d 1103 (7' Cir. 1979) (rejecting allegations of breach of fiduciary
duty on part of defendant bank, but granting a preliminary injunction against corporate
acquisition on antitrust grounds).
92. Aardal, supra note 80, at 789-95.
93. See Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 83, at 1804.
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working on the Talley account from communicating with those persons
working on the Washington Steel account. In addition, the officer in
charge of the Washington Steel account personally secured all of the
files relating to that account. 
94
One common method used primarily for intradepartment
conflicts is a team-based assignment approach. In other words, banks
will compartmentalize projects and create small teams to work on
sensitive projects. All confidential information derived from the
project is then confined to that team. The first important step in a
team-based approach is selection of the appropriate team members.
No team member should have any nonpublic information about
another bank client (i.e., a takeover target) that has conflicting
interests with those of the team's client (i.e., a bidder). This is
essential to avoid any accusation that a team member with confidential
information is sharing that information with the other members of the
team or with the team's customer. One way of managing team
selection is to have a coordinator or manager who assigns people to
various teams as new projects come in. The team coordinator must be
aware of all transactions coming into the bank that might result in
conflicts between the bank's customers and must track what teams
different individuals are assigned to in order to avoid placing them on
teams with potential conflicts. Thus, the bank will need to implement
a "clearinghouse procedure. 95
For conflicts such as the acquirer/target situation described
above, the bank may want to implement special procedures. For
example, a request for financing of a tender offer could bypass
"normal" lending channels and move directly to a more senior officer
level where the matter could be contained. Because of the large dollar
amounts involved in takeover transactions, it is reasonable to have
more senior officials in charge of making these financing decisions. 96
A Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) proposal from the late
1970s included various other suggestions directed toward the conflicts
resulting from the takeover context. For example, the SEC proposed:
(1) requiring disclosure of the lending bank's identity if it had a "prior
94. See Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp, 602 F.2d 594, 603 (3d Cir. 1979).
95. Aardal, supra, note 80, at 789-95.
96. See Butch, supra note 33, at 268 & n.126.
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or present commercial relationship" with the target company,97 (2)
prohibiting the bank from disclosing any nonpublic information to the
acquirer; and (3) enacting a provision that would "clarify the SEC's
authority to promulgate rules governing the use by banks and other
financial intermediaries of material, nonpublic information concerning
a subject company in connection with planning, financing or otherwise
participating in or rendering advice in connection with, a tender
offer." 98 Approximately twenty years later, these proposals have not
been enacted, and the SEC has not promulgated rules directly on this
subject. Case law and the federal securities laws, however, would
prohibit disclosure of nonpublic information to the acquiring company.
In most cases, a combination of the above measures will be
required. For example, one financial institution has implemented a
Chinese Wall conflicts policy that includes the following guidelines:
(1) Prior to accepting any engagement with a new
client or a new engagement for an existing client, the
senior banker on the team must determine the scope
and nature of any prior or existing relationship between
the bank and that company;
(2) For any type of nonpublic engagement, all
information must be kept on a "need to know" basis.
"Need to know basis" means that information must not
be shared with any nonbank personnel and should be
shared only with bank personnel that have a "need to
know" the information. That is, disclosure should be
made only in furtherance of the project to those
working on the project. All recipients of information
must be instructed that the information is to remain
confidential. Even within a department or business
group, information should only be disclosed in
furtherance of the project in order to prevent personnel
from being foreclosed from participating on other
97. The scope and object of this disclosure is not clear from the SEC proposal.
98. L. RICHARD FISCHER, BANK USE AND PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION, 7.03 (discussing the Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange
Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Bank
Financing of Tender Offers, at 27 (undated)).
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teams or projects. For example, if nonpublic
information about a client that is a bidder in a
corporate auction situation is disclosed to a bank
official even though that official has no need to receive
that information, then that official would needlessly be
foreclosed from participating on a team organized to
serve another bidder in the same auction.
(3) For the same reasons as discussed above, the bank
policy also cautions against sharing information
between different business groups within the same
department unless client consent is first obtained.
The policy provides additional specific rules that are directed
to the acquisition conflicts described above:
(1) The involved bankers must ask whether the client's
target is an existing client. If the target is a client of
one of the bankers, that banker must immediately
withdraw from the engagement. The acquiring client
should simply be notified that the banker has a
"personal conflict" and will be replaced. The bank
can then continue with the transaction. Even if the
target is not a client of any of the bankers assigned to
the new engagement, if the target is a client of the
bank, then the bank must determine whether, based on
policy reasons, it wants to accept the acquirer's
engagement proposal. The risk should be discussed
with senior management, compliance and legal.
Separate deal teams must be established.
(2) A conflict may also arise if there are multiple
bidders for a target. If such a conflict exists,
management, in consultation with legal and
compliance, must determine whether to proceed. If the
bank decides to proceed, it must create completely
separate deal teams all the way through senior
management. No information may be shared between
teams.
(3) In all conflict situations, the engagement letter
1999]
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should contain provisions that: (a) disclose potential
conflicts; (b) notify clients that the bank is a common
carrier that finances many competing interests; and (c)
provide appropriate indemnities. Counsel should
participate in the preparation of any such letter.
(4) All engagements with potential conflicts must be
assigned a code name by the time the client makes the
decision to proceed. The compliance department must
be given the code name. The code name must be used
in all communications among team members and with
client representatives.
A bank's duty does not end with the creation of a Chinese
Wall. Rather, it should effectuate a compliance program to ensure
that personnel are following the policies and procedures of the Chinese
Wall. 99 For example, a bank may have continuing education programs
regarding such policies and procedures. In addition, the bank may
want to establish an internal auditing system. For the problem of
information flow from various bank departments to the trust
department, specific measures such as watch lists may also be used.' 0
A watch list is a device used to monitor employee and customer
transactions and research in the securities of corporations for which
the bank has obtained, or is likely to obtain, nonpublic information.
The purpose is to detect potential breaches of the bank's Chinese Wall
policies and procedures. The contents of the watch list are known
only by a limited number of selected members of the compliance
department and upper-level management. Regardless of the
procedures selected by the bank, all personnel should be encouraged to
discuss all conflict concerns and questions with a member of the
compliance department or with legal counsel.
99. See Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 83, at 1804.
100. See id. at 1805.
[Vol. 3
INTRABANK CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
III. CONFLICTS ARISING FROM DUAL ROLES
The potential for a conflict of interest also arises when a bank
serves both as principal lender to and indenture trustee for a
corporation issuing public debt. Although a bank acting in this dual-
role has a potential conflict between its interest as a lending bank and
its interest as a fiduciary for bondholders, this arrangement is quite
common. Unlike the other potential conflict situations discussed in
Section I above, the legislature has developed specific rules to provide
guidance in this area. Prior to the enactment of the Trust Indenture
Reform Act of 1990 (TIRA), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA)
provided statutory conflict of interest guidelines for indenture trustees.
Neither the TIA nor the TIRA imposed a prohibition on the bank's
ability to act in both roles. Rather, the statutes attempted to minimize
the potential for conflicts of interest.
The TIA set forth nine different situations in which a conflict
of interest arose. If one of the described situations occurred at any
time when the securities were outstanding, a conflict of interest arose,
and certain relationships were prohibited. Over time, and primarily as
a result of increased syndications, the TIA rules became burdensome.
In the course of reevaluating the TIA and enacting the TIRA,
Congress determined that, because of the ministerial nature of trustee
duties prior to default, there was no danger of abuse and thus no real
potential for conflict prior to default.
Accordingly, in 1990 Congress enacted the TIRA, which
emphasizes a post-default conflict of interest standard. A conflict of
interest arises after default because both the bank, in its role as lender,
and the bondholders (to which the indenture trustee owes a fiduciary
duty) want to be paid, and there is only one sum of money from which
payment can occur. Under the TIRA regime, there is a 90-day period
in which a default must be cured, or the conflict of interest eliminated.
If either the default or the conflict exists at the end of the 90-day
period, then the trustee must resign and a successor will be appointed
in the manner set forth in the indenture. 101 In addition, upon default, a
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b) (1994); see also Joseph F. Kelley, Jr., The Indenture
Trustee and Conflict of Interest Concerns, in PROBLEMS OF INDENTURE TRUSTEES AND
BONDHOLDERS 1992: DEFAULTED BONDS & BANKRUPTCY, at 197 (PLI Real Est. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. N4-4561, 1992).
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creditor relationship becomes an explicit and prohibited conflict of
interest.0 2
One commentator has suggested that the adoption of a post-
default conflict standard does not completely eliminate pre-default
conflict of interest risk. According to this commentator, the TIRA
cannot eliminate "true conflicts" such as the following: "if a lending
bank improves the nature and value of the collateral for its loan
knowing that the borrower is in financial extremis, it is by no means
clear that it can put its head in the sand as the borrower moves toward
a default on the debentures for which the banking institution acts as a
fiduciary indenture trustee." 103 A minor syndicate member, however,
with no substantive role in due diligence would not be subject to the
same level of scrutiny as the lead lenders. "o Therefore, although the
TIRA provides more guidance for indenture trustees than the TIA
provided, the continuing possibility of potential conflicts of interest
"should continue to make corporate trust departments
uncomfortable."' 0 5 As with the other conflict situations discussed
above, this is an area where banks must continue to think about the
possibility of conflicts and how best to address them in an evolving
banking environment.
Conflicts of interest are of growing concern and significance in
a rapidly expanding banking industry. As a result of these changes,
banks will need to anticipate potential conflicts in new contexts. For
instance, as banks shift the focus of their customer relationships from
traditional debtor-creditor to advisory in nature, their use of nonpublic
information becomes more suspect, and thus must be more closely
monitored. Whether a potential conflict is based on the dissemination
of confidential information or performing the dual role of lender and
fiduciary under an indenture agreement, banks must be prepared to
develop and employ effective defensive strategies. If banks fail to
innovate, they may find themselves responsible for breaches of
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(10).
103. Kelley, supra note 101, at 205.
104. See id.
105. Id., at 208 (concluding that "the increased activism of corporate debtholders, the
obvious flood of contentious litigation, the manifest interest of the court and public in the
role of banks and others in highly leveraged transactions, and perhaps even common
sense, all raise difficult questions about the indenture trustee's role in modern corporate
financing).
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unforeseen fiduciary obligations. At a minimum, until banks provide
stronger assurances of confidentiality, these "complicated relationship
issues" may cost them customers.
56 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 3
